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We examine the impact of competition and portfolio diversification on banking stability 
for conventional and Islamic banks in Indonesia. We find that the Islamic banking 
sector is less stable, when compared to the conventional banking sector. Competition 
in the banking sector reduces stability, while diversification enhances it. We find that 
competition negatively impacts the Islamic banks, but diversification has no impact on 
these banks. An interesting finding is that competition and diversification complement 
each other in enhancing the stability of the Indonesian banking sector. These findings 
carry an important policy implication for the banking sector of Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As competition among banks increases, they tend to shift their focus towards non-
traditional activities1 (Pennathur, Subrahmanyam, and Vishwasrao, 2012) to make-
up for drops in profits, by diversifying their sources of revenue. Hence, banks’ 
non-traditional activities may play a role in the relationship between competition 
and bank stability. The interrelationship among competition, stability, and 
diversification became more important after the global financial crisis of 2008/09 
(Pawlowska, 2015). Understanding the role of competition and diversification in 
bank stability has become even more important in recent times, given the severe 
disruptions of global financial markets caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.2 In 
the literature, many studies have targeted US and European countries when 
examining the relationship among competition, stability, and diversification and 
found mixed results (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011, Schaeck and Cihak, 2014, Fiordelisi 
and Mare, 2014).
As far as Asian countries are concerned, the relationship among competition, 
stability, and diversification has been rather under explored. Indonesia is one 
of the few economies, which successfully survived the global financial crisis. 
Indonesia’s economy had a quick recovery with fewer bank failures (Agnes 
Isnawangsih, Klyuev, and Longmei Zhang, 2013), which provided evidence 
of better preparedness after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis.3 This has drawn 
interest among researchers to investigate the sources of Indonesia’s resilience to 
global financial crisis. 
Another interesting feature of this country, which has the largest Muslim 
population in the world, is the prevalence of a dual banking system i.e. Islamic 
banking and conventional banking systems.4 In 2008, Indonesia introduced a 
separate governing act for Islamic banking (Ali and Khattak, 2020) . Research 
has suggested that the development of Islamic banking has added to Indonesia’s 
economic development (see Zahra, Ascarya and Huda, 2018; Juhro et al., 2020). 
This makes Indonesia’s banking sector very attractive to study because, as noted 
by Azmi et al. (2019), the rise in competition in a dual banking environment is 
expected to affect conventional banks more as their customers may choose to 
shift to Islamic banks, whereas the customers of Islamic banks may not switch to 
non-shariah compliant banks. Researchers have studied the regulatory and risk 
management systems of Indonesia but have seldom focused on the impact of 
market competition and non-traditional sources of revenues on banks.
1 Non-traditional activities include fee-based services like securities brokerage and selling insurance 
and asset-based activities, such as investment banking, venture capital and securitization of assets 
(DeYoung and Torna, 2013).
2 Several studies, such as Appiah-Otoo (2020), Devpura (2020), Devpura and Narayan (2020), Fang 
& Zhang (2021), Hoang & Syed (2021), Gil-Alana & Monge (2020), Gil-Alana & Claudio-Quiroga 
(2020), Huang & Zheng (2020), Iyke (2020a, b), Iyke and Ho (2021), Narayan (2020a, b, c), Phan and 
Narayan (2020), Prabheesh et al. (2020), Wang & Su (2021), Yang & Deng (2021), Salisu & Adediran 
(2020), Salisu & Sikiru (2020), Sha & Sharma (2020), Sharma & Sha (2020), and Sharma (2020), show 
that the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted global economies and financial markets. 
3 Juhro and Iyke (2019) note that Indonesia is one of the severely affected countries by the Asian 
financial crisis.
4 Juhro et al. (2020) highlight some of the appealing features of an Islamic financial system.
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To fill this gap, this study examines the relationship among bank stability, 
competition, and diversification. Many studies have studied the impact of 
competition on risk or diversification on risk (Agnes Isnawangsih et al., 2013), 
but there are relatively fewer studies that have studied the interrelationship 
among these variables, especially, in developing countries like Indonesia. Azmi 
et al. (2019), in their study on 22 dual banking economies, found no difference 
with regards to the impact of diversification and competition on the stability of 
Islamic and conventional banks. In this study, we suggest that the link between 
stability and competition (diversification) may be contingent on the level of banks’ 
diversification (competition) strategy. We hypothesize that the benefits from 
diversification may bring a difference in the impact of competition on stability. We 
further hypothesize that the pressure of increasing competition may push banks to 
move towards income diversification strategies, which may affect bank stability. 
Banks tend to opt for different income sources to hedge their risk (Froot and Stein, 
1998) and to enhance profitability and efficiency (Landskroner, Ruthenberg, and 
Zaken, 2005). 
Our research contributes to the growing literature on competition–stability 
and diversification–stability links with special focus on dual banking (Azmi, Ali, 
Arshad, and Rizvi, 2019; Kabir and Worthington 2017). In this study, we attempt 
to address five objectives. Specifically, we examine: (i) the impact of competition 
on bank stability; (ii) the impact of diversification on bank stability; (iii) whether 
the impact of competition and diversification on bank stability is different for 
Islamic banks; (iv) the moderating role of competition and diversification on 
the competition–bank stability and diversification-bank stability relationship 
for the overall sample; (v) whether there is any difference in the moderating 
role of competition and diversification on bank stability for Islamic banks and 
conventional banks5. 
To address our objectives, we first dig into the measurement of stability and 
competition. We measure stability using a widely used Z-score (see Phan et al., 2020). 
We measure competition using a market power measure, the Lerner index, which 
is an inverse measure of competition (Azmi et al., 2019). For more robust analysis, 
and to control for possible issues of unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and 
autocorrelation, we use the system generalized method of moments (GMM). 
Our study reveals that Islamic banks are less stable as compared to conventional 
banks. As we probe more, we find that competition among Indonesian banks 
appears to reduce their stability, whereas portfolio diversification seems enhance 
stability. We find competition harms Islamic banks’ stability, whereas we do not 
find any impact of diversification. We further find a negative moderating role of 
competition and diversification in bank stability, which suggests that competition 
and diversification can complement each other in enhancing the level of stability 
in the overall Indonesian banking sector.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the 
literature review. In section 3 presents the data, discusses how the variables are 
5 This study conducts a cross check on the moderating role of competition and diversification between 
competition-stability and diversification-stability relationship, respectively. This is explained in 
detail in section IV B.
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calculated, and briefly describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 provides the conclusion and policy implications.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The studies on competition and bank stability show contrasting views. Primarily, 
there are two main theories concerning the impact of competition, namely the 
competition–stability and the competition–fragility theories. The competition–
fragility theory argues that, as the new players enter the industry, the market 
share of banks and bank profitability decreases, and in turn pushing banks to 
indulge in risky business activities to enhance their profitability (Allen and Gale, 
2004; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000). This theory has been tested and 
supported by Fungáčová and Weill (2013) and Jiménez, Lopez, and Saurina (2013). 
On the other hand, the competition–stability theory suggests that, as the market 
power increases, bank risk also increases. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed that 
normally the loan rates are higher in lesser competitive bank markets, which force 
borrowers to venture into riskier projects to increase their profit margin (see Leroy 
and Lucotte, 2017). This theory has been verified by Fiordelisi and Mare (2014), 
Pawlowska (2016) and Schaeck and Cihak (2014).
The impact of competition on stability in dual banking economies like 
Indonesia is rarely examined in the literature. Azmi, Ali, Arshad, and Rizvi (2019) 
and Kabir and Worthington (2017) tried to fill this gap by employing panel data 
from different dual banking economies. They suggest the presence of competition–
fragility hypothesis for both Islamic and conventional banks. But these studies 
were more generic as they look at several economies at once. Rizvi et al. (2019) 
studied the impact of Islamic banks on the Indonesian banking sector, but their 
focus was not directly on competition and income diversification. Ali et al., (2020) 
studied East Asian dual banking countries and found an increase in competition 
due to Islamic banks increases the stability of the banking industry, although it 
does not impact profitability. 
Another strand of literature discusses the diversification strategies that banks 
adopt in response to a high level of competition (Pennathur, Subrahmanyam, and 
Vishwasrao, 2012). Diversification helps banks to enhance/maintain their market 
share (Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2009). Despite the number of studies 
presenting the benefits of income diversification, Deyoung and Roland (2001) have 
argued that diversification increases bank risk. They suggest that diversification 
increases fixed costs and earnings volatility. They put forth three explanations 
for the increase in risk due to the income diversification strategies of banks. 
Firstly, switching to different banks is easier in non-traditional activities because 
of the shorter nature of engagement. This enhances the bank’s income volatility. 
Secondly, banks need to invest in terms of fixed cost, if they want to indulge in 
non-traditional activities, as they require different technology and talent. Lastly, 
regulators do not set any capital requirements on these non-traditional activities. 
This can also decrease bank stability. Several studies, including Mercieca, Schaeck, 
and Wolfe (2007) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006), do not find any association 
between income diversification and bank stability. On the other hand, Baele, De 
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Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) and Landskroner, Ruthenberg, and Zaken (2005) 
show a positive association between diversification strategies and bank stability.
The aforementioned studies have predominantly focused on the US and 
European countries. As far as developing Asian economies are concerned, very 
limited studies exists on the relationship between non-traditional activities and 
bank stability. Rizvi, Narayan, Sakti, and Syarifuddin (2019), recently studied 
the relationship indirectly. There are also very few studies on individual dual 
banking economies, except for Abdullah et al. (2011), who focused on Malaysia 
and Karakaya and Er (2012), who focused on Turkey. Even these studies have only 
focused on the impact of diversification on bank performance.
In this study, we do not only look at the direct relationship between 
competition and stability, and diversification and competition, but we also 
examine the interlinkages among these three variables, by interacting competition 
and diversification.
III. DATA, VARIABLE SPECIFICATION, AND METHODOLOGY
The study relies on banking data sourced from the Fitch Connect database, which 
provides detailed information on banking financial statements, globally. The 
country-level variables are sourced from World Development Indicators database 
of the World bank. To have a more reliable dataset, we use only consolidated data 
to avoid any double-counting, in addition to limiting the dataset to at least 3 years 
of observations on banks. The final dataset consists of an unbalanced annual panel 
data of 123 banks (including 13 Islamic and 110 conventional banks) in Indonesia 
from 2007 to 2018. The dataset starts from 2007 as that was the time when the 
Islamic banking act was approved in Indonesia. Additionally, following Azmi et 
al. (2019) and Čihák and Hesse (2010) the sample is further split into large and 
small banks. Banks with total assets lower than 1 billion are classified as small and 
big otherwise. Upon classification, the dataset is split into 66 large banks and 79 
small banks. 
A. Model Development and Methodology
Considering the nature of this research, employing traditional panel estimators for 
regression analysis like pooled ordinary least square (POLS), fixed effects (FE), and 
random effects (RE) estimators might not be suitable. The issues like unobserved 
heterogeneity, endogeneity, and correlation might result in erratic results and 
conclusions. Besides this, the dependent variable might dynamic or persistent, 
which is a very crucial factor to consider in economics and finance studies. To 
control for potential persistency of the dependent variable, we include a lag of the 
dependent variable in the model. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
(that is zscoret-1) in the model makes the POLS, FE, RE estimators inappropriate 
for our analysis. Instrumental variable estimators are appropriate in this setting; 
however, finding instruments that are highly correlated with the lagged dependent 
variable but uncorrelated with the error term is difficult. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggested a consistent GMM estimator to address all these issues. The so-called 
difference GMM (DGMM) estimator uses the lagged values of exogenous variables 
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as instruments. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
criticize the estimator and argue that, if the instruments used in the estimation are 
weak, the difference GMM might be ineffective. With this criticism, they proposed 
the system GMM estimator, which uses the lagged level and the lagged differences 
of the variables as instruments. 
Roodman (2009) suggests that the difference and system GMM estimators can 
address the issues of unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, correlation concerns, 
and persistence. Furthermore, the system GMM estimator is most suitable when T 
is small, N is large, and when the dependent variable is dynamic (i.e. persistent). 
In addition, the system GMM estimator is suitable when control variables might 
correlate with the error term (i.e. control variables are not exogenous) and when 
there is heteroscedasticity in the data, which are more probable in bank-level 
data. The two-step system GMM estimator refines the quality of estimation, 
while controlling for endogeneity, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity issues 
(Roodman, 2009). 
We use the system GMM estimator to examine the impact of bank competition 
and diversification on bank stability and to explore any moderating roles of 
competition and diversification in shaping the relationship of either variable with 
stability. Along with one period-lag of zscore, we applied different diagnostic tests 
to address possible issues of autocorrelation and over-identification of instruments, 
using the Hansen test (Hansen-PV) and the autocorrelation tests (AR1, AR2). 
Using Roodman (2009)’s xtabond2 command, the system GMM estimator is based 
on forwarding orthogonal deviation instead of first differencing because our 
panel data unbalanced. The system GMM estimator is more suitable in this case 
because the difference GMM estimator magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels (Iyke, 
2017). While estimating the models, the lagged dependent variable is treated as 
endogenous, the bank-specific variables are treated as potentially endogenous or 
predetermined and the country-specific variables as treated as strictly exogenous 
variables. To examine the impact of competition and diversification on financial 
stability zscore separately, we estimate the following models: 
where, t and j denote year and bank. zscore is bank stability indicator; zscorejt-1 is the 
one-period lag of bank stability. Lerner denotes the inverse measure of competition 
measured by banks’ market power. Diver denotes the income diversification. BS 
denotes the bank-specific characteristics that might affect the stability of banks. 
Islamic indicates the dummy variable for Islamic banks, which takes the value of 
1 if the bank is Islamic and 0 otherwise. Mac indicates macroeconomic variables, 
which include the banking market structure (HHI) in the country, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth rate and inflation rate, is used to control for the country-
specific heterogeneity. ε indicates residuals.
The limited number of Islamic banks in the dataset does not allow us to conduct 
a split sample analysis. Therefore, we introduce dummy interaction terms in the 
following models to differentiate the impact of diversification and competition 
(1)
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on Islamic bank stability from conventional bank stability. The significance of the 
interaction terms would indicate the difference in the impact of diversification and 
competition on Islamic banks vs conventional banks in Indonesia. To do this, we 
estimate the following modified model:
To explore the moderating role of competition and diversification in shaping 
the relationship of either variable with stability, we modified Equation (1) by 
including of an interaction term between the Lerner index and diversification 
Lerner*Diver. The significance of the interaction term would indicate any possible 
moderating role. The modified model is as follows: 
(2)
We further examine whether the moderating role of competition and 
diversification is different for Islamic banks. To do this, we modify Equation (3) 
using a 3-way interaction term, Lerner*Diversification*Islamic. This interaction term 
consists of two continuous variables (Lerner index and diversification) and one 
categorical variable, Islamic dummy. The significance of this simple yet complex 
interaction term would indicate the difference in the moderating role of competition 
in the relationship between diversification and stability and the moderating role of 
diversification in the relationship between competition and stability. The modified 
model is given as follows: 
(3)
B. Dependent Variables
To measure bank stability, we use the Z-score, which is widely used in the literature 
(Albaity, Mallek, and Noman, 2019; Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Phan et al., 2020). This measure shows 
the distance from insolvancy (Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Goetz, 2017; 
Leroy and Lucotte, 2017; Nurul and Worthington, 2015). Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2009) referred to Z-score as an upgrade of the indicators used in 
the literature, such as accounting ratios like NPL, interest-margin, and capital-
adequacy. The higher the Z-score, the lessor the risk, and therefore the greater the 
stability. We use a three-year rolling window to estimate standard deviation of 
return on assets, which is generally sufficient to allow for variation in the Z-score. 
To avoid the skewness in the Z-score, we use its natural logarithm. We calculate 
Z-score as follows:
(4)
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where Zscore denotes Z-score, Equity ratio indicates the ratio of equity to total 
assets, ROA denotes that return on assets. SD of ROA is the 3-year rolling window 
standard deviation of return on assets. 
C. Independent variables
Competition is considered one of the main determinants of bank risk, due to its 
impact on banks’ earnings (Adjei-Frimpong, Gan, and Hu, 2016; Schaeck, Cihak, 
and Wolfe, 2009; Ariss, 2010). It is almost impossible to measure bank competition; 
therefore, the literature proposes the use of bank market power instead, where 
lower market power implies greater competition and vice versa (Azmi et al., 2019). 
This research employs a bank-level measure of market power, the Lerner index, 
which is an inverse measure of market competition. This is unlike Rizvi, Narayan, 
Sakti, and Syarifuddin (2019), who used an industry level concentration measure 
as a proxy for bank competition. The Lerner index is defined as the margin that a 
bank can set above its cost. It combines the price and the marginal costs to estimate 
the bank’s power in the market. Unlike the H-Statistic, Boone Indicator, and 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index, the Lerner index can be estimated at each point in 
time and is considered as short-term equilibrium measure, which gives the Lerner 
index a special position. The Lerner index is given as follows:
(5)
Pjt denotes the price, whereas MCjt denotes the marginal cost of bank j, in year t.6 
Diversification is measured as the ratio of total non-interest income to total 
income. This is used to examine the impact portfolio diversification on bank stability 
and it differs across banks according to their investment strategies. Researchers 
are inconclusive about the relationship between diversification and bank stability. 
While some found a positive relationship between income diversification and 
stability and concluded that more diversified banks are better stable (Amidu 
and Wolfe, 2013a; Liu et al. 2012), others found a negative relationship between 
these variables. For example, Deyoung and Roland, (2001) found that higher 
diversification brings more risk. Hence, based on the literature, the sign of this 
variable is uncertain. 
To control bank-specific characteristics that might impact bank stability, we 
use bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (TA), the equity 
ratio also called capitalization ratio (EQTA), bank loan ratio (GLTA) and the Cost 
to Income Ratio (CIR). It is argued that banks with bigger sizes and higher equity 
6 For detailed explanation on Lerner index, see Ariss (2010), Boateng, Asongu, Akamavi, and 
Tchamyou (2018), Kabir and Worthington (2017), Kouki and Al-Nasser (2017), and Nguyen, Perera, 
and Skully (2016).
(6)
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ratios have higher financial performance and are better stable (Liu et al., 2012). 
Loan ratio is used to control the credit exposure of banks, as they might have 
significant effects on the banks. Furthermore, it is argued that banks that have 
higher loan ratios are likely to have poor performance and are risky and unstable 
stable (Alaeddin, Khattak, and Abojeib, 2019). Ideally, a higher loan ratio should 
increase the level of riskiness; however, it will not be surprising if this research 
finds a positive relationship between loan ratio and stability measure. This might 
be due to the reason that banks with higher loan ratios might be able to accumulate 
higher gains, hence, are more stable. For instance, Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe 
(2007) found that banks with higher lending activities tend to perform better and 
are better stable, but at the cost of higher risk. The cost to income ratio is measured 
as the ratio of operating costs to income, where cost-efficient banks are expected to 
be better stable. This ratio shows the costs of running the bank, the major element 
of which is staff salaries and benefits. 
Following the studies of Boyd, Nicolò, and Jalal (2006), Fungáčová and Weill 
(2013) and IJtsma, Spierdijk, and Shaffer, (2017), the concentration–stability/
fragility view further motivates us to control for market structure and to include 
market structure (HHI) as a control variable in the model. HHI is defined as the 
sum of the squares of the market shares of the banks in the market (Bikker and 
Haaf, 2002).7 We argue that if the market is concentrated, it does not necessarily 
mean that there is no competition and that concentration and competition can co-
exist in the market. 
To control for the differences in the macroeconomic environment, we include 
GDP growth rate and inflation rate in the model. It is argued that the global 
financial crisis causes the banking market to undergo reform and structural 
changes, which are believed to affect banks’ financial performance (Abuzayed, Al-
Fayoumi, and Molyneux, 2018; Fu et al., 2014). Therefore, we introduce a crisis 
dummy in the model, which has a value of 1 for the year 2008-09 and 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 presents the variables, their definitions, expected signs, and their sources.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the dataset used in the analysis. For 
the full sample, the mean for zscore, is 3.18 with a deviation of 1.01. This shows 
that Islamic banks have lower stability as compared to conventional banks. 
The mean value for Lerner index is 0.35, which indicates relatively moderate 
level of competition with variability of 0.17. Islamic banks appear to be more 
competitive than conventional banks. Bank diversification has a mean of 0.18 with 
a standard deviation of 0.19. Islamic banks seem to be better diversified than their 
conventional counterparts. Table 3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients 
for all the variables using Pearson’s correlation test. The correlation coefficients 
reveal a weak relationship between the independent variables; therefore, we do 
not observe the existence of multicollinearity.
7  HHI is estimated as: HHI= 2 , Where j is the number of banks in the country in a year.
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Table 1.
Definitions and Sources of the Variables
This table provides the definitions and sources of the variables used in this study. + denotes positive relationship, - 
denotes negative relationship, and +/- denotes mixed findings. FCDB and WDI denote, Fitch Connect Database and 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, respectively.
Variable Symbol Definition Expected Sign Source
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Stability zscore
The ratio of the sum of equity 
ratio to total assets and ROA 




Panel B: Core variables
Competition Lerner
Market power, used as 
an inverse measure of 
competition
+ Authors’ estimationFCDB
Diversification Diver Total Non-interest income / total income +/- FCDB
Panel C: Bank Specific variables
Cost to income ratio CIR Operating Cost to income ratio - FCDB Authors’ calculation
Equity ratio/
Capitalization EQTA
The ratio of Equity/Total 
Assets + FCDB
Loans ratio GLTA Gross loans/Total Assets - FCDB
Bank size TA The logarithm of Total Assets + FCDB
Islamic Islamic takes the value of 1 if the bank is Islamic and 0 otherwise +/-
Panel D: Industry-Specific variables
Concentration HHI Market Structure +/- FCDB
Panel E: Macroeconomic Variables (Mac)
Global Financial 
Crisis Crisis
Dummy variable takes a value 
of 1 for the year 2008-09 and 0 
otherwise
-
GDP growth rate GDPGR The annual GDP growth rate + WDI
Inflation rate INFR Inflation rate WDI
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Table 2.
Summary Statistics
This table reports selective descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the study. The Panels A, B, and C 
summarize the statistics for Full sample, Conventional banks, and for Islamic Banks, respectively. The basic statistics 
include the number of observations, mean value, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), observations (Obs), maximum (Max) 
and minimum (Min) values. In this table, zscore represents banks stability. Lerner denotes the inverse measure of 
competition. Diver denotes the income diversification. TA denotes the bank size, EQTA represent equity to total assets, 
CIR represents cost to income ratio, and GLTA represents gross loans to total assets. Islamic indicates the dummy 
variable for Islamic banks, which takes the value of 1 if the bank is Islamic and 0 otherwise. Macroeconomic variables, 
GDP growth rate (GDPGR), inflation rate (INFR).
Variable zscore Lerner Diver TA EQTA CIR GLTA HHI GDPGR INFR
Panel A: Full sample
Obs 899 952 968 968 968 968 968 968 968 968
Mean 3.18 0.35 0.18 7.03 0.14 5.40 0.64 0.07 5.44 5.51
Std. Dev. 1.01 0.17 0.19 1.57 0.09 30.51 0.12 0.01 0.56 1.62
Min -2.30 -0.75 -2.95 2.68 -0.27 -364.40 0.05 0.06 4.63 3.53
Max 5.78 0.95 1.23 11.28 0.86 383.86 0.99 0.09 6.35 10.23
Panel B: Conventional Banks
Obs 844 893 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909
Mean 3.19 0.35 0.18 7.04 0.15 5.26 0.64 0.07 5.44 5.52
Std. Dev. 1.00 0.17 0.19 1.59 0.09 31.10 0.12 0.01 0.56 1.63
Min -2.30 -0.75 -2.95 2.68 -0.27 -364.40 0.05 0.06 4.63 3.53
Max 5.78 0.95 1.17 11.28 0.86 383.86 0.99 0.09 6.35 10.23
Panel C: Islamic Banks
Obs 55 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
Mean 2.93 0.27 0.25 6.85 0.11 7.58 0.68 0.07 5.46 5.38
Std. Dev. 1.12 0.13 0.19 1.34 0.06 19.13 0.11 0.01 0.56 1.45
 Min 1.29 -0.11 -0.02 3.62 0.05 -64.51 0.08 0.06 4.63 3.53
Max 5.30 0.51 1.23 8.78 0.36 112.62 0.83 0.09 6.35 10.23
Table 3.
Correlation Analysis
This table reports the correlation matrix for all the variables using Pearson’s correlation test. The statistics in bold are 
significant. The full names of the variables are in Table 1.
Variable zscore Lerner Diver TA EQTA CIR GLTA HHI GDPGR INFR
zscore 1
Lerner 0.255 1
Diver -0.101 0.235 1
TA 0.0389 0.374 0.200 1
EQTA 0.252 0.163 -0.0687 -0.375 1
CIR -0.0665 -0.112 0.0334 -0.0286 -0.0643 1
GLTA -0.0208 -0.0731 -0.224 0.0682 -0.123 0.0377 1
HHI -0.0982 0.0120 0.107 0.0226 -0.107 0.0324 -0.229 1
GDPGR -0.0978 0.0732 0.115 0.0513 -0.111 0.0295 -0.0947 0.477 1
INFR -0.0696 -0.0131 0.0508 -0.0522 -0.0926 0.00752 0.00592 0.214 0.272 1
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A. Regression Analysis and Results
This section further addresses the objectives of the study. The section presents 
the results and discussion on how competition and diversification influence bank 
stability. In Table 3, we estimate two different model specifications using the 
system GMM estimator. We estimate M1 and M2 using Equation (1). We estimate 
M1 including only bank-specific controls, and M2 considering the macroeconomic 
condition of Indonesia. In Table 4, we obtained the results by estimating Equation 
(2). Here, we examine the difference in the impact of competition and diversification 
for Islamic banks. That is, we modified M2 to include additional controls for 
market structure. Tables 5 and 6 present the regression results from Equations (3) 
and (4), respectively. The model diagnostics indicate the validity of the model. The 
number of instruments is less than cross-sections (Roodman, 2009a), the significant 
AR (2) tests show the consistency of the estimates. The Hansen tests show that the 
instruments are valid because they are not correlated with the error terms. This 
means that all the models are free of over-identification and are correctly specified. 
Table 4 presents the baseline results on the impact of competition and 
diversification on stability using Equation (1). The lag dependent variable is 
highly significant, indicating the persistence in the stability measure, which 
further justifies the use of a dynamic estimator. The Lerner index shows a positive 
impact on bank stability, implying that an increase in market power (decrease 
in competition) results in greater stability. Put differently, a decrease in banks’ 
market power (increase in competition) might lead to lower stability and increase 
risk. This suggests that an increase in competition makes the banks take on 
riskier investments making them more fragile. Another possible explanation 
for this relationship can be that, in high competition, banks compete to capture 
the market share of deposits by offering higher deposit rates. Banks also cut the 
lending rates to encourage lending. This can result in higher bank costs and lower 
bank revenues, thus resulting in a negative effect on bank stability. Moreover, on 
the lending side, banks also relax the lending conditions, which impede the loan 
quality of the banks. Hence, banks further face bad debts and nonperforming 
loans, which decrease bank stability through increased bank risk. This is in line 
with the competition–fragility view and supports the arguments of Forssbæck and 
Tanveer (2011), Kabir and Worthington (2017), and Keeley (1990). In Models (1) 
and (2), the coefficients of diversification show a positive impact on bank stability, 
suggesting that an increase in income diversification results in greater stability. 
Diversified banks have more options for activities to choose from and therefore 
may realize economies of scope and scale. Since diversified banks tend to have 
greater profitability, they are more stable. This is in line with the studies of Amidu 
and Wolfe (2013), who also found a positive relationship between diversification 
and stability. 
Banks size appears to be positively impacting bank stability in Model M1 and 
the impact becomes negative after controlling for macro-level characteristics. This 
suggests that the impact of bank size might be different when the macro-level 
characteristics are taken into consideration. Besides that, bigger banks might be 
better stable because bigger banks tend to perform better and enjoy economies of 
scale (Beccalli, Anolli, and Borello, 2015). In Model M2, bank size shows a negative 
impact on bank stability, which might indicate that bigger banks are lesser stable 
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due to their size. This may be because it becomes difficult to manage bigger 
banks as compared to smaller banks (Pawlowska, 2016). Equity ratio appears to be 
positively impacting zscore, suggesting that higher equity ratio is associated with 
enhanced stability. This may be because banks with higher equity ratio are more 
capable of compensating higher risks. A possible explanation for this could be that 
banks with aggressive lending behavior are able to collect more profits, therefore 
lending makes them less risky (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007). The Islamic 
dummy appears to be insignificant, suggesting insignificant difference in the level 
of stability of Islamic banks. GDP growth rate and inflation rate have a negative 
impact on bank stability, suggesting that banks might be less stable with an increase 
in GDP growth rate and inflation rate in the country. Interestingly, impact of the 
global financial crisis (Crisis) on Indonesian banks’ stability is positive, indicating 
that Indonesian banks managed to effectively overcome the effects of the financial 
crisis. Cost to income ratio does not show any significant impact on bank stability. 
Table 4.
Impact of Competition and Diversification on Stability
In this table, we report results for the impact of competition and diversification on banks stability. Mode1 (1) (M1) 
is estimated with only bank-specific explanatory variables and Model (2) (M2) is modified with country-specific 
characteristics, where GDP growth rate, inflation rate, and crisis are added to the model. In this table zscore is bank 
stability. zscorejt−1 is the one period lag of bank stability. Lerner denotes the inverse measure of competition. Diver 
denotes the income diversification. TA denotes the bank size, EQTA represent equity to total assets, CIR represents 
cost to income ratio, and GLTA represents gross loans to total assets. Islamic indicates the dummy variable for Islamic 
banks, which takes the value of 1 if the bank is Islamic and 0 otherwise. Macroeconomic variables, GDP growth 
rate (GDPGR), inflation rate (INFR), and Crisis are included in the M2 model. Finally, ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
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B. Impact of Competition and Diversification on Stability (Islamic vs Conventional Banks)
Table 5 presents the baseline results obtained by estimating Equation (2), models 
the difference in the impact of competition and diversification on stability for 
Islamic vs conventional banks. The results suggest that there is a difference in 
the impact of competition and diversification for conventional banks and Islamic 
banks. The Islamic dummy appears to be negative and significant, indicating 
that Islamic banks are less stable than their conventional counterparts. One of 
the possible arguments for this finding might be that conventional banks are 
bigger than Islamic banks, which makes them more stable (Alaeddin, Khattak, 
and Abojeib, 2019). These findings are in line with Wahid and Dar (2016), who 
compare the stability of Islamic and conventional banks in Malaysia and found that 
Islamic banks are lesser stable. The coefficient of the Lerner index is insignificant 
for conventional banks and is significant for Islamic banks, thus supporting the 
competition–fragility view. A good explanation is This might be due to a large 
number of conventional banks, which, one might say, is the mature sector of the 
country and the fact that Islamic banks are facing immense competition from both 
conventional and Islamic banks (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche, 2013). 
Moreover, diversification only impacts conventional banks. Figures 1 and 2 show 
the marginal impact of the Lerner index and diversification on stability, which 
confirm the significant difference in the impact of competition and diversification 
for Islamic and conventional banks. Among the controls, only equity ratio shows a 
positive impact and is in line with the earlier findings in Table 4. 
Table 4.
Impact of Competition and Diversification on Stability (Continued)
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Table 5.
Impact of Competition and Diversification on Stability (Islamic vs Conventional)
In this table, we report the results for the impact of competition and diversification on banks stability for Islamic and 
conventional banks. Mode1 (2) is modified with an additional control variable for market concentration (HHI). Finally, 
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Figure 1.
Marginal Effects of Diversification on Stability (Conventional vs Islamic)
The figure shows the marginal impact of diversification on stability for conventional banks and Islamic banks. It 
appears that diversification does not show a significant evidence of impact for Islamic banks. For conventional banks, 
however, the impact is positively significant.





















Marginal effects of Lerner index on Stability (Conventional vs Islamic)
The figure shows the marginal impact of Lerner index on stability for conventional banks and Islamic banks. It 
appears that the Lerner index does not show a significant evidence of impact for conventional banks. For Islamic 
banks, however, the impact is positively significant.
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C. Impact of the Interaction between Competition and Diversification on Stability 
Table 6 shows that results on the moderating role of competition and diversification 
in shaping the relationship of either variable with stability using Equation (3). 
The interaction term (Lerner*Diversification) shows a negative and significant 
moderating role. Figures 3 and 4 show the marginal impact of the interaction of 
the Lerner index and diversification. We plot the marginal impact of the Lerner 
index on stability as diversification changes in Figure 3, which shows that the 
impact of the Lerner index decreases as the level of diversification increases. Put 
differently, the impact of competition increases with a rise in diversification. This 
suggests that diversification can be used as a tool to avoid the negative impact of 
competition on bank stability, as found in earlier results in Table 3. Figure 4 shows 
the role of the Lerner index in shaping the relationship between diversification 
and stability. The figure suggests that the impact of diversification decreases as the 
Lerner index increases. In other words, the impact of diversification decreases with 
a decrease in competition and the impact is only significant below and above the 
moderate level of competition. Figures 3 and 4 together suggest that competition 
in the market and the level of diversification complement each other to enhance 
the level of stability. Therefore, one can be used to make up for the impact of the 
other on stability. 
Table 6.
Impact of the Interaction between Competition and Diversification on Stability
In this table, we report the results for the impact of the interaction between competition and diversification on banks 
stability. Mode1 (2) is modified with an additional control variable for market concentration (HHI). Finally, ***, **, and 
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Impact of the Interaction between Competition and Diversification on Stability 
(Continued)
Figure 3.
Marginal Effects of Diversification on Stability as Lerner index Varies
The figure shows the marginal impact of diversification on the stability of the entire banking sector of Indonesia as 
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D. Impact of the Interaction between Competition and Diversification on Stability 
(Conventional vs Islamic Banks)
Using Equation (4), Table 7 extends the results in Table 6 and examines whether 
the moderating role of diversification and competition is different for Islamic 
banks. For brevity and simplicity, we only focus on the interaction term, 
Lerner*Diversification, and the 3-way interaction term, Lerner*Diversification*Islamic. 
The coefficients of interaction terms show an insignificant impact on conventional 
banks (Lerner*Diversification) and show a positive significant impact on Islamic 
banks (Lerner*Diversification*Islamic). Figures 5 and 6 show the marginal impact 
of the Lerner index and diversification on stability for Islamic and conventional 
banks. Figure 5 suggests that diversification does not play a significant role in the 
relationship between competition and stability in the case of conventional banks. 
However, the figure shows a very different picture for Islamic banks, suggesting 
that, as diversification increases, the impact of the Lerner index increases as well. 
In other words, the impact of competition decreases with an increase in the level 
of diversification for Islamic banks. Islamic banks are argued to diversify their 
portfolios to avoid the negative implications of competition for stability (Azmi 
et al. 2019). Furthermore, Figure 6 presents the marginal impact of diversification 
on stability, as the Lerner index changes for Islamic and conventional banks. The 
figure does not provide any significant evidence of the role of the Lerner index 
in the case of conventional banks. For Islamic banks, the figure suggests that 
the impact of diversification increases with a decrease in competition, and the 
moderating role is only significant at a high level of competition. 
Figure 4.
Marginal Effects of Lerner index on Stability as Diversification Varies
The figure shows the marginal impact of the Lerner index on the stability of the entire banking sector of Indonesia. It 
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Table 7.
Impact of the Interaction between Competition and Diversification on Stability 
(Conventional vs Islamic)
In this table, we report the results for the impact of the interaction between competition and diversification on 
banks stability for Islamic banks and conventional banks. Mode1 (2) is modified with an additional control variable 
for market concentration (HHI). Finally, ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 




















Lerner * Islamic 0.0230(0.932)
0.0163
(0.950)
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Figure 5.
Marginal impact of the Lerner index on stability as diversification varies (Islamic 
vs Conventional)
The figure shows the marginal impact of the Lerner index on the stability of conventional and Islamic banks as the 
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Figure 6.
Marginal impact of Diversification on stability as Lerner index Varies (Islamic vs 
Conventional)
The figure shows the marginal impact of diversification on the stability of conventional and Islamic banks as the 
Lerner index increases. The figure shows that the impact of diversification is only significant for Islamic banks at low 
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E. Robustness Checks
The skewness in our dataset (with 110 conventional and only 13 Islamic banks) 
limits our ability to split the sample into Islamic and conventional banks and re-
estimate the baseline models. Therefore, we use dummy interactions instead. For 
robustness tests, using different panel estimators might be an option. However, 
the dummy variable for Islamic banks will be omitted using the difference GMM 
and fixed effect estimators due to the 0/1 within differences.8 Thus, we extend our 
model by including additional variables and try different model specifications to 
seek robustness for our findings. These results are reported in Table 8. Following 
the recent work of Ali and Khattak (2020) on Indonesia, we use the ratio of loan/
financing loss provisions to total assets (LLP) and the ratio of deposits to total 
assets (CDTA) as additional bank-specific variables. Besides that, we replace the 
GDP growth rate and inflation rate with GDP per capita growth rate. In Table 8, 
we re-estimate the models and found that the results are robust to different model 
specifications. In Model (1), the Lerner index does not show a significant impact 
in the case of conventional banks and shows a highly positive and significant 
impact for Islamic banks, supporting the competition–fragility view and is in line 
with the earlier findings of Table 4. Diversification shows a significant impact on 
the conventional banks and an insignificant impact on Islamic banks. It seems 
that conventional banks benefit from portfolio diversification and enjoy greater 
stability, unlike Islamic banks.
8 Initially, we tried to use non-performing loans; however, we found missing data for over 300 
observations in the dataset obtained from Fitch Connect. Therefore, to avoid any ambiguous and 
unreliable results, we do not rely on non-performing loans.
Table 8.
Robustness: Impact of Interaction between Competition and Diversification on 
Stability (Conventional vs Islamic)
In this table, we the report results for the impact of non-intermediation income on banks performance. Models (1), 
(2) and (3) are re-estimated by including additional variables to add credence to the results in Tables (5), (6), and 
(7), respectively. The additional variables are deposits ratio (CDTA), loan loss provisions (LLP) and GDP per capita 
growth rate (GDPC) are added and GDPGR and Inflation are excluded from the model. Finally, ***, **, and * denote 
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Table 8.
Robustness: Impact of Interaction between Competition and Diversification on 


































































AR(1) (0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0107)
AR(2) (0.9512) (0.9543) (0.0386)
Hansen-PV (0.0499) (0.1989) (0.1892)
Moving to Model (2), the coefficient of the interaction term (Lerner 
*Diversification) is negatively significant and is consistent with the earlier findings. 
In Model (3), the interaction term for conventional banks (Lerner *Diversification) 
does not show any significant impact, suggesting that there is no moderating 
impact of competition or diversification on the stability of conventional banks. 
For Islamic banks, the 3-way interaction term is positively significant, indicating a 
significant role of diversification and competition. These findings are in line with 
the earlier findings in Table 6. The impact of CTDA is found to be positive for all 
the models, suggesting that an increase in customer deposits results in enhanced 
stability. The loan loss provision ratio shows a negative impact on stability, 
suggesting that an increase in the LLP reduces the level of bank stability. These 
results are in line with the findings of Ali and Khattak (2020). 
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This research achieves five objectives. Firstly, it examines the impact of competition 
on bank stability. Secondly, it examines the impact of diversification on bank 
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stability, Thirdly, it examines whether the impact of competition and diversification 
on stability is different for Islamic banks. Fourthly, it examines the moderating role 
of competition and diversification in the relationship of either variable with bank 
stability for the overall sample. Lastly, it explores whether there is any difference in 
the moderating role of competition and diversification in the relationship between 
either variable and stability for Islamic banks and conventional banks. We do this 
by studying 123 banks in Indonesia from the period 2007-2018. 
For the full sample, we found that Islamic banks are less stable as compared 
to conventional banks. The findings suggest that competition among Indonesian 
banks appears to be reducing the stability and portfolio diversification, which 
seems to be enhancing stability. Upon analysis of the difference in the impact for 
Islamic banks, we found that competition negatively impacts the Islamic banks, 
but diversification has no impact. We further found a negative moderating role for 
competition and diversification, suggesting that these variables can complement 
each other in enhancing the level of stability in the overall Indonesian banking 
sector. Further analysis suggests a difference in the moderating role for Islamic 
banks, whereby the moderating role only appears to be significant for Islamic 
banks. 
These results carry important policy implications for the banking sector 
of Indonesia. Firstly, to ensure stability, policymakers and regulators should 
encourage portfolio diversification and control competition in the banking sector. 
Since the Islamic banks are less stable and are more vulnerable to competition, 
competition within Islamic banks should be given extra attention. Given that 
diversification and competition can complement each in achieving enhanced 
stability, banks’ management, policymakers, and regulators can use diversification 
and competition in the banking sector to ensure the stability of the country’s 
banking sector. 
This research also carries some limitations, we rely on the Fitch Connect 
database for classification of banks. Besides that, missing information on risk 
proxies does not allow us to conduct robustness tests using different risk proxies 
like non-performing loans. The availability of more accurate data would have led 
to more robust findings. To get more objective policy implications, we recommend 
studying the impact of different factors of income diversification and banking 
competition on bank stability. 
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